Saturday, 28 February 2009

FINANCIAL STRESS-TEST-DUMMIES AND BANK-SIMULATORS

The Obama administration this week ordered the 19 biggest US banks to run stress tests to check how well they can hold up if the economy deteriorates much further, and to thereby calculate how much more funding they will need before recovery is underway. This is like asking jumbo-plane aircraft pilots to land with faulty instruments in fog safely with minimal damage. When recently a pilot with extremely well-honed skills landed in the Hudson River and all passengers and crew were saved that was sheer brilliance. Would any flight simulator have allowed the same result - no, the built-in tolerances and probabilities would have dictated failure! And, would any other pilot have succeeded - maybe a few, but most not! What made the difference between success and failure was partly the plane, largely the pilot and also largely the conditions including the availability of the liquid landing zone. In banking terms those are the conditions to be determined by Government. The stress-tests are not just to test the banks, but also their strategy, operations and risk management, and then also to provide evidence, clues, indicators, stories of events so Government can also determine what it is that it must do to manage the financial and economic conditions. These stress-tests should also stress-test government bail-out measures. The pilots of the economy are also to be thereby tested. Banks think this is about testing their balance sheets and detailed accounts as seemed to be what stress-testing is in the dealing rooms and in Basel II Pillar II banking regulations. No, this is big picture stuff, and this is always what this stress-testing was meant to be, to test how well bank managements understand the economic context in which they do business. The crash-test dummies are in the boardroom.
To take the analogy further, it is not about how many passengers are on board to be saved or even what the plane is like. This is about how good, how comprehensive, the instrument controls are, and how responsive they are? Markets may be more or less liquid and customers and counter-parties more or less risky, but how much finger-tip control is there and how intelligent and powerful is the auto-pilot and do the pilots decide to dump their fuel over the sea, or save fuel for a possible quick take-off again, or to fly another 500 miles to the next airport? Are the cockpit controls and the accounting system completely accurate and the pilots fully experienced and trained in all weathers. Or is your bank's stress-test capability actually less like a complex flight simulator and more like a car-crash-dummy-test, more like a metal cage with car seats, and safety-belted nodding dummies round the board table? If you don't have the systems, then car-crash -dummies is your bank's default stress-test mode and I don't care how clever you think your guys are with their spread-sheets; this is not a spread-sheeting exam, and not merely a self-assessment exam either! Just ask yourself, can your bank model and explain why and how asset prices, stock values, have disconnected so blatantly from income-stream valuations? Ask yourself if your risk accounting and general ledger actually validate each other and then whether you can compute dynamically and in full double-entry styles in both banking and trading books for the political-economy, global markets, domestic retail and corporate banking for changes in PD, LGD, EAD, ELGD for the quarters ahead and for over the credit and economic cycles. If you think the answer should be yes, think again! The results are expected by or before the end of April. Banks will then have 6 months to raise the extra funding they think they may need from private sources or accept federal aid with conditions attached. The Government, like an air traffic control tower, wants to avoid taking over the flight instructions, it wants to dictate height and heading and make sure there are no air-to-air collisions and that the runway is clear and well-lit up. But government does not want to take over flight-pilot controls, not of large banks. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke says government may take substantial minority stakes in Citigroup and other troubled banks only if they can't raise sufficient new funding elsewhere. Six months from now the technical recession should be over and modest positive growth returning. But, banks will have a difficult time just to survive the turbulence until then and to steady themselves onto exactly the right path for a soft landing. For important advice on various ways of determining your liquidity risk and solvency tests see the attached lengthy comment below.
Barack Obama on Wednesday described some principles for new financial regulation, signaling that the government would oversee a much wider range of financial activity and take a stronger hand in doing so. Gordon Brown and his team in the UK are doing and saying very much the exact same, including calling for stress tests. And he has begun to use a new repeatable phrase that of 'cleaning out the banks', words that have now taken on a whole new meaning quite different from the Hole In The Wall Gang, the James brothers or John Dillinger. I can't recall any time in the past when respectable people were going to clean out the banks? Of course, if Governments want to do that they can. But President Obama says, "While free markets are the key to our progress, they do not give us free license to take whatever we can get, however we can get it," and "Strong financial markets require clear rules of the road, not to hinder financial institutions but to protect consumers and investors." Let the banks be warned; these stress tests are about whether your bank needs cleaning out in a good way. "Cleaning out" in a bad way is what variously happened to Bear Stearns, Merrill-Lynch, Wachovia, HBOS, Fortis, WaMu, Dexia, Citicorp, RBS and others, though I am impressed with the new managements at both RBS and LBG. These banks were variously shown up to be flown by poorly equipped pilots, and in some cases by dummies (HBOS) or crash-test fighter-pilots (Lehman Brothers). The cleaning out will also extend to restructuring the regulators and bringing in new much more solid expertise. This is happening in Europe, the UK and USA.
Speaking after a meeting with key lawmakers and senior advisers, Obama said his government needs to overhaul the frayed patchwork of regulatory agencies that oversee the financial industry. He expressed support for increased consumer protections. He indicated he favoured empowering the Federal Reserve as a regulator of systemic risk (gosh, where was that responsibility hitherto?), with authority over any financial firm or instrument that could destabilize the economy. That's the key question stress-tests have to answer, who's next for a military-style haircut and strict exercise regime? The European Commission and ECB want similar answers, the IMF too, and, in the UK, the Bank of England. This is not an academic research project taking 4 years. The answers to these complex questions are required in 4 weeks. But improving on stress-test models and cockpit risk management control systems will require banks to focus on these in the boardroom regularly for at least 4 years (cost across all banks in Europe and USA = $8bn estimate). The US Administration will present a more detailed plan for regulatory reform in early April, when leaders of the G20 wealthiest nations, each with their own stress-tested plans, meet in London. By then, round the same table, all will know the global depth of the banking industry's political-economy crisis, and no dummies any longer tolerated there. That's my expertise, all of this, and I and my colleagues at asymtopix.eu and union-legend.com and what we know of the companies we talk to, none any longer can afford to under-estimate the challenges involved here.
WHAT IS THE CHALLENGE?
If you are in or close to the executive and full boards of a major bank, let me say categorically: It is not bottom up deal by deal stress-test technology or risk models and risk policies from the dealing rooms. It is not top down, comprehensive, national and global economic modeling. It is not stressing of risk factor ratios or moving up and down risk grade tables. It is not reliant on what we already know, not about adding up all risk buckets and business lines, to collate and correlate. It is not about dumping spreadsheets and getting in the super-computers and a new general ledger system, new software, years of new external and internal data, new definitions and holistically integrating taxonomies for all credit risks and all market risks. It is not about liquidity risk and risk concentration versus asset class and economic sector diversification.
It is all of this, a triangulation, top down, bottom up and sideways along, outside and not just inside the bank, and a damn sight more than all of this too covering what's happening to the whole of banking, and in the markets and among government policy options and the bank's business strategy options, and can't be done by persons who only have silo understanding and not a full grasp of the totality. It cannot be done except by those who thoroughly and professionally understand the totality of a bank, in finance, accounting, risk and economics, and the totality of Basel II Pillar II and the coming of Basel III, and why even Pillar I implementations are deeply flawed, and why Pillar II is a dangerous distraction and probable big mistake! If you understand where this shopping list of a rant comes from, then you are halfway there and should be advising the top of your bank or already in the boardroom! Retail giants such as Bank of America, HSBC, RBS, Citigroup and specialty, less retail, and non-retail banks such as JPM, State Street, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs are all now required to measure their likely losses in the event that the credit and economic gets worse before it gets better. Officials say the tests will assume that the unemployment reaches 10.3% by the end of 2010 (currently 7.6%), average home price fall from bubble-peak hits 47% (27% so far). Mortgage defaults are over 9%, sub-investment grade corporate bonds heading there, consumer debt maybe 6%, prime quality bank debts maybe still pretty low at variously around 3%. But what if default rates for many broad classes trend to some similar higher rates as the domino or systemic impacts pull down good quality with the bad?
What if it doesn't matter if your are a creditor or debtor nation, all lose similar growth, and what if most or all businesses, most or all creditors and debtors, good as well as bad banks, all suffer significantly? What if it is not about whether your balance sheet is 5%, 10% or 25% better quality than the next bank, because that will matter a lot less in 6 months time than it matters now? The test will also assume that economic activity as measured by gross domestic product shrinks by 3.3% in 2009 before recovering slightly in 2010. Great, but does your bank know how to translate that into anything meaningful. Is 3.3% inflation-adjusted GDP, 2% or 6% before subtracting for inflation? Can your bank survive better if other banks survive better, or better if your bank does better than others who are then doing significantly worse? Is it better to take government investment on board and central bank funding and insurance guarantee programmes or better to keep going without that - better for whom - your bonuses, your shareholders, your customers, and or the economy? Will your bank do better if it can somehow deleverage and behave pro-cyclically or better if it can grow lending and act anti-cyclically, better if it delivers higher profits from traditional banking or lower profitability from traditional banking?
As a bank, what is it you are legitimately doing apart from providing a transmission mechanism as a public service? Is your idea of success and benefits the same as the government's that has to care about the whole economy as you should be too? Is a much higher financial margin profitability of the whole financial sector better or worse for the economy right now? Does your economic capital model tell you anything to adjudge your answers to these questions? The answers to these questions in the longer term are no problem, but for the next 1-2-4-6 years that is another matter altogether? The Government does not care about individual players; it wants to see the whole picture of what banks need to be that fits intelligently with what the economy needs them to be right now? Do banks, or your bank, know how to think about that? Yes is easy, elaborating on that answer is not. The Government is your bridging loan, but only if your bank can determine how to be a bridging loan in turn for the economy, and maybe in several economies? There is also so much peer-review going on that looking for a presentational answer that cannot be validated in depth won't wash. Confidence is more than skin-deep, and loss of confidence is fatal. See: www.union-legend.com/index.php?page=references There is a certain rhetorical quality to these questions. Where they are not rhetorical is where we really do not have the political-economy macro-answers, and worse where not even the biggest banks have the data or the systems and completed models to find their own reliable answers with any substantial % confidence whatsoever? It is a wholly different game to forecast via scenario stress-tests for some theoretical set of future-shocks at some indeterminate time over the horizon. What can be done and how is to be done when already in the middle of the distress, in the middle of the fat-tail unexpected risk distribution, that's quite different and not to be understood in the Basel II and Solvency II regulatory advice notes, or even from the very best academic papers - they're being thoroughly revised and rewritten - who in your bank reads them?
Regulators are in the business of providing clues and indicators, not glide-paths for exactly how to do any of this. It is nothing like regulatory risk model equations. For example, regulators have calculated that there is roughly a 10% chance that economic conditions would reach say a 3.3% real GDP fall in 2009 based on a consensus of economic forecasts, which has never been much of a reliable benchmark. Therefore, prominent economists are saying the probability is much higher than 10% and banks and government should test for a more catastrophic scenario. I agree, do you? But, some analysts say the worst projections are not much more dire than what many private forecasters already expect e.g. 5% real GDP fall in 2009. And, anyway, the worst scenarios are not that, not how bad will 2009 be, it is whether the economy might remain flat for a few years thereafter i.e. not a V- or U- shaped recession but an L-shaped one. That will test banks capital reserves to destruction beyond the 200% wipe-out currently being faced. It would not be hard to show a bad year wiping out reserves by another 50% and 3 years flat growth by over 100% again! According to the new Treasury Department guidelines, the banks would have to assume that the economy contracts by 3.3% in 2009 and flat in 2010, and housing falls 22% generally on top of the 15%+ so far, then maybe recovery is regionally patchy after that, especially across the US States in 2010, while unemployment goes up to 9% then over 10% in 2010. Does your bank know what PDs and LGDs could become in these years. Can you even dynamically model for that either at portfolio, aggregated bucket, level or for every account in the books? Have you got integrated accounting and computing power to process all that in less than one month? If not, how else will you get a realistic approximation - try talking to Lloyds Banking Group, or RBS, or central banks or others?
"I don't think they (the stress conditions) are harsh enough," said David Hendler, analyst at CreditSights, who says the dire projection is too optimistic about how much growth will be generated from President Barack Obama's fiscal deficit stimulus programme. "That would be a pleasant outcome, but you have to plan for the worst." I agree. The average outlook of private-sector forecasters envisages the economy shrinking by 2% this year and unemployment peaking just below 9% in 2010. But, even the biggest banks are regional not just national and regional variations in a country the size of the USA are significant. Big banks are also internationally exposed, and globally in respect of wholesale financial markets, which hardly anyone has ever been able to soundly model in respect of national or international or global economic models, and of which there are not many around. The trading books have small RWA calculations but we know these are now unreliable. Can your bank stress-test collateral, security, hedges and cross-border financial flows, corporates and industry sectors, and interbank credit in the trading book as readily as credit risk and collateral in the banking book? The stress-tests must adjust for changes in market liquidities. Do you know how to measure the liquidity of markets, never mind liquidity risk of your own bank. By 'model' I and regulators and economists do not mean 'make assumptions' but integrate all major factors into accounting models over time whereby factors constrain each other? Is this a high-level project with top quality people do the work or a low-level delegated work relying on simply processing every combination of likely factor values?
Everyone's recent forecasts including by the Federal Reserve and most private forecasters have undershot the severity of the downturn. Big banks — those with more than $100 billion in assets — have to carry out supervised analyses by April of how much their capital would be depleted under the Treasury Department assumptions. If U.S. banking regulators conclude that your bank may not have enough capital under those circumstances, the bank has six months to sort the problem - is 6 months realistic and practical? It is only if the tests show that your minimum regulatory capital survives at least 6 months?
The Treasury said that it would provide new capital in exchange for shares of preferred stock that could be converted to shares of common stock at a price slightly below the level at which the shares traded on Feb. 9. The UK seems to be offering similar but with conversion rates at markedly higher prices than current share prices. For many of the US big banks, 9 Feb price is slightly higher than today, but still at fire-sale levels. In a telephone conference call with reporters, officials from the Fed and OCC said there would be no simple measure for "passing" or "failing" a test. The FDIC has firmer standard tests and these might kick in on insurance guarantee rates sooner. It's not exactly clear if the FDIC and the fed are singing from exactly the same hymn sheet? "It sure sounds to me like they are designing this to make it sound like the banking system is in great shape," Paul Miller, an analyst at Friedman, Billings Ramsey, a brokerage firm that specializes in bank stocks, said to the Washington Post. This is his interpretation of officials says their goal is to increase confidence of investors and depositors in the big banks, providing tangible evidence that the institutions would have enough money, whether they had to raise it from private investors or get it from taxpayers.
What this is really about is trying to get a consensus view of the expected shape of the credit cycle and economic cycle from the perspective of banks' capital resources. Fed officials said there is no cap on how much money a single institution could get. But that is of course how banks got into funding gaps that proved hard to maintain, so maybe some ratio caps to current funding gap or deposits might seem sensible. Officials declined to estimate how much money the government would end up injecting before the crisis was over. This is a sensible answer given the variety of means available, but over $2 trillions would be the ballpark just for big banks. Banks and other "qualified financial institutions," which now includes investment banks and insurance companies that are part of bank holding companies, can start applying for more money immediately.
Christopher Whalen, MD at Institutional Risk Analytics, said Citigroup and other major banks would almost certainly become insolvent once they absorb the full brunt of losses from the economic downturn. That is absurd, since it fails to see that banks don't just stand still in their liquidity management. He said, "The stress test is about politics. The OCC and the Fed already know the answer. The answer is that we're going to have to come to a decision: are we going to put in more equity or are we going to resolve the banks through bankruptcy?" This is now classic doomster headlining for the media. This is not the question or the answer. Bankruptcy is not an option. replacing ownership and getting rid of managements and bad bank work-out funds and much else are options, active choices in play right now.
Europe is focusing hard on the G20 concerns to take urgent steps to overhaul regulation of big cross-border banks. President Obama met with Congressional legislators to discuss an overhaul of how the financial regulatory system manages risk in the future. Emerging from the meeting, Obama said the first principle of a new system should be that financial institutions "that pose serious risks to the markets should be subject to serious oversight by the government." The EU European Commission has exactly the same intent to be applied to the top 45 banks. Obama also said that the regulatory system should be strengthened to withstand major stresses and that the government should take steps to rebuild trust in markets by promoting transparency. This also means bringing off-exchange markets on-exchange. With the exception of government spending, every major component of the economy shrank in 2008.
Output fell 6.2% at an annualised rate in the 4th quarter of 2008 (also by 6% in 4th quarter in the UK), revised downward from a previous estimate of a 3.8% decline. The drop was steeper than the consensus estimate of 5.4% - far steeper than 0.5% of the previous quarter.This was enough to have immediate ripple effects globally. The economy took the biggest hits in exports, retail sales, equipment, software and residential fixed investment plus contraction in inventories (usual sign too of drop in loan financing) of unsold goods despite lower consumer sales. But this data will continue to be severely revised for another year. The trade gap that had been narrowing widened as exports fell at an annual rate of 23.6% shaving a full 1% of GDP and is a sign of downturn spreading through the rest of the world. This all bodes ill for business investment and sure enough it fell at an annualized rate of 28.8%, also a sign of bank credit being choked off or debt restructuring. deposit savings crept up but private savings will only jump significantly once the Government bond auctions for 2009 are well underway and hopefully banks will grow their loans by an aggregate of 10% minimum, what Government is hoping to see, and that means growing capital reserves proportionately too. For much more read comment below.

1 comment:

ROBERT MCDOWELL said...

This is based on a long but brilliant paper by John Hempton sent to me by Prof. Mehrling of Columbia Univ. NYC, because it agrees with my paper on the capital wipeouts and replenishment published in www.union-legend.com late last year. To read it more easily I suggest cutting and pasting into a document editor.

Bank solvency and the "Geithner Plan"
by John Hempton, 16.02.09
(with some edit-paraphrasing by Robert McDowell plus a few additional points)
Warning – read only if you are really interested in banks and the crisis. If so, read to the end. If you are working with Messrs Geithner, Bernanke, or their European equivalents read it now all the way to the conclusions.Note: the author is an ex-Australian and New Zealand Treasury official.

Hempton says no-one cannot possibly decide what banks are worth without understanding where the politics is going. For stress-testing therefore there are that there many possible outcomes, but all uncorrelated to the solvency of the banks.

For example, WaMu was solvent (subject to definitions below) but was confiscated – while according to the FDIC it had enough capital. Wachovia was forced to sell itself when solvent. Wells Fargo happily purchased it, like Lloyds bought HBOS, and both buyers can prove the point. AIG was shockingly insolvent and shareholders were 80% diluted. Citigroup was in much bigger trouble than WaMu (actually illiquid) and shareholders were succoured with $45bn of very cheap government money + $300bn guarantees.

1. Government Policy

Government policy is very hard to determine. Under the Bush administration there was no policy. Each financial institution in crisis was handled a different way – think Bear, Lehman, AIG, Fannie and Freddie, WaMu, Wachovia, Citigroup. No two deals were even close to similar.

We have now gone from an administration which had no plan to the “Geithner Plan”. “Scare quotes” around “Geithner Plan” are because it is unfair to call the “Geithner Plan” a “Plan”. As yet there is no detail – without detail you don’t have a plan. That said – lets put some framework around “the plan” – so-called.

2. Let’s diagnose the problem

The problem is not yet well diagnosed. We have a lot of pools of bank assets (pools of loans) with the following properties:

- The assets sit on the bank’s balance sheet with a value of 90 – meaning they have been marked down to 90 (say mark to mythical market or to model) or have 10 in provisions for default losses.

- The same assets when run off might make 75 – if you run them to maturity or default the bank will – discounted at a low rate – recover 75 cents in the dollar on value.

- The same assets if sold in the market (which does exist if you wish to discover the price) trade at 50 cents in the dollar.

- The banks are thus under-reserved on a “held to maturity” basis, heavily so. If you make full provisions – not all but many banks – would have negative net worth and few would meet capital adequacy standards.

Given that the penalty for even appearing as if there is a chance of not meeting capital adequacy standards is death (e.g. WaMu and Wachovia) and that this is a self-assessment exam, banks can be expected not to tell the truth.*

Why it is possible that loans that will recover 75 trade at 50? Well it's obvious – they recover 75 if the recoveries are discounted at a low rate. If I am going to buy such a loan I probably want 15% per annum return on equity. (15% is the current typical underlying return on capital reserves and the typical overt return on share capital).

- The loan initially yields say 5%. If I buy it at 50 I get a running yield of 10% - but say 15% of the loans are not actually paying that yield – so my running yield is 8.5%. I will get 75-80c on them in the end – and so there is another 25cents to be made – but that will be booked with an average duration of 5 years – so another 5% per year.

- At 50 cents in the dollar the yield to maturity on those bad assets is about 15% even though the assets are “bought cheap”.

15% is not enough for a hedge fund to be really interested – though if they could borrow to buy those assets they might (or if US fed lends them $1 trillion cheaply to do so as part of TALF?). The only problem is that private funding to buy the assets is either unavailable or if available with nasty covenants and a high price. Essentially the 75/50 difference is an artefact of the crisis and the unavailability of funding.

3. The problem with new loans?

The difference between the yield to maturity value of a loan and its market value is extremely wide. The difference arises because you can’t easily borrow to fund the loans – and my yield to maturity value is measured using traditional (low) costs of funds and market values loans based on their actual cost of funds (very high because of the crisis).

The spread between the origination value of a loan and its secondary value is huge. It simply makes no sense to originate new loans when you can buy old loans so cheap.

Because it makes no sense to originate new loans banks will not do it unless they are driven by an “institutional imperative” (or they don’t know what else to do, or they are told by Government orders and funding conditions), or are forced into anti-cyclical responses by regulators, or they are trying to prove their solvency by using capital (something Hempton elsewhere accused Barclays of).

The irrationality of this market pricing of new lending compared to buying existing loans cheaper has dire economic consequences. At worst business just stops because firms can’t get trade finance, working capital, bonds marketed or other contractual funding or any of the other basic banking services extended. Some banks are already choking off unused overdraft facilities and other lines of credit.

3. Some reasonable numbers for the USA?

Reasonable numbers include:

- The US banking system starting capital reserve (pre-crisis) was $1.4 trillion,
- US Banks have raised about $500 billion along the way,
- Financial institutions have passed say 300-700 billion in losses outside the banking system (such as to defaulted bonds on Lehman) or to hedge funds that have blown up, or to non-bank holders of junky CDS (e.g. Norwegian local government authorities). Indeed, the whole point of securitisation was that it took the loans and losses out of the banking system,

The resulting cumulative losses (25 cents in the dollar not recoverable as reasonable argued above) total $1.5 to 2 trillion and mark-to-market losses (where the assets are marked to the market price for those assets e.g. CDS spreads) is about $3 to $4 trillions. (Note: The current Nouriel Roubini number is $3.4 trillion.)

The hardest of numbers to determine is the final realised cumulative 'economic losses', because it is a forecast.** You can’t possibly know the end-losses until the loans have run to maturity or to 90-day default, then cancellation and recovery. Moreover, government responses will, in large measure, determine this number. If the government handles it poorly then end-losses will be larger.

The starting capital, plus capital raised along the way, less deductions, and economic losses outside the financial system are all just hard facts (though Hempton's quantification is not fantastic and agrees with mine, but nevertheless there are serious accounting /quantitative difficulties to do with full as double-entry book-keeping accounting standards, whether GAAP, IAS and or IFRS). The mark-to-market loss can be estimated where liquid market prices are observable – but banks are not happy to tell you what is on their books. And, more importantly, they don’t want to find out the price for those assets because they know above all that this is a self assessment exam (now also a stress-test modeling exam) for which the penalty of failure is death of the bank. Hempton suspects, and I agree, the end cumulative losses will be at the low end of medium term forecast range and that mark-to-market losses will be at the high end of the range (twice bank capital, though Roubini is an optimist on mark-to-market losses and 1.5 times bank capital).

Hempton observes that the starting capital for the US banks was high. He says $1.4tn, but I, McDowell, put it at £1.1tn to $0.9tn at mid-2007. US regulators by-and-large forced banks to have a lot of capital (OCC looks for 4% ratio to gross assets that roughly equates to the Basel standard of 8% to RWA net asset exposures, but this is the minimum, added to which regulators require 'economic capital buffers'. Hempton says regulators were more lax in Europe and totally so in the UK. The UK problems arise in part because the banks started the cycle massively capital- deficient. This is true in key examples such as RBS and others too, and reflected a lack of urgency and tolerance to allow banks more time to transition from Basel I to Basel II and more time than was safe or prudent to fully implement Pillar II of Basel II.

4. Are the banks solvent?

It has been the generally accepted public opinion that the US banking system is insolvent. See Paul Krugman, Yves Smith, or Felix Salmon, for examples. But, Hempton is not sure that anyone has defined or understood solvency appropriately. This is a most interesting part of his paper.

So let's think about different solvency definitions – and if banks meet them. It is unclear what solvency definitions people are using. Here is a list:

Definition 1: Regulatory Solvency. Does the bank have adequate capital to meet solvency tests imposed by regulators?

Definition 2: Does the bank have positive net worth under GAAP accounting (YTM, yield to maturity with appropriate provisions when YTM is required or mark to market otherwise)?

Definition 3: Positive economic value of an operating entity. If the bank is allowed to continue to operate it will pay all its debt and replenish its capital?

Definition 4: Positive liquidation value. If liquidated today at current market prices would the bank have positive value?

Definition 5: Liquidity: Does the bank have adequate liquidity to operate on a day to day basis? (A more severe version of definition 3 above, but actually it is about whether and at what cost the bank can wholesale fund its funding gaps between loan assets and deposit liabilities).

Looking at the banking system against each definition of solvency should clear up the woolly thinking on solvency and on liquidity risk.

4.1 Solvency against definition 1: does the banking system currently contain adequate regulatory capital. The answer is not likely – though if you ran for 3-4 years you might get there. The US banking system started with $1.4tn – which was near regulatory minima. In the 'great boom' banks assumed if they ran with minimum capital they raised ROE, return on equity up. And, indeed, this was the prevailing attitude to Basel II - how to use it to reduce capital requirements. As starting capital was near minimum capital, and $1.5-2 tn was lost (yield-to- maturity definition) and only $500bn new capital raised, collectively the banks are short. Pre- tax, pre-provision operating profits of greater than $300bn per annum with normalised funding costs, would not recover the difference.

There is disparity among banks and some have gone negative regulatory capital (including probably WaMu had it been left to continue standalone). Regulatory insolvency is far greater if marking assets to market. But, outside the brokerage area (trading book and assets-for-sale) most banks don’t have to mark assets to market. Now, inside the trading book, inside the brokerage area, they really want the mark-to -market rules suspended, or diluted by allowing a through-the-cycle valuation.

Trading books (or loans originated for sale) are by accounting standards mark-to-market. This is a big problem because the market price is substantially lower than the yield to maturity value. We see values of the stock, the marketable asset, have, as it seems to those seeped in pre-crisis values, to have disconnected from values based on income flows. If a bank did a lot of trading (Citigroup) or originated a lot of loans for sale but was stuck with them at the end (RBS's private equity loan book, or HBOS's property portfolio) then it is likely to be deeply insolvent on a regulatory standard because it needs to mark those loans to a the very low market price.

These banks squealed for suspension of mark-to-market rules and resisted Basel II Pillar II to the last moment. Hempton says he would have some sympathy with them only if they could account for their complaints on a reasonable yield to maturity basis with reasonable reserves. But, he cannot trust them – after all, they are bankers and they lie.*** McDowell agrees, until now when new, more intelligent, transparency has been introduced in both RBS and HBOS by new management.

Nonetheless regulatory capital is not the central touchstone for liquidity risk or the main solvency indicator. The whole point of regulatory capital is to ensure buffers in case of a really bad downturn, severe stress-shocks. When the really bad downturn happens the buffers will be be used. McDowell predicts 90% capital wipeout in a normally severe recession, while double this when credit crunch is included.

As Hempton says, it’s perfectly normal (and acceptable) to have inadequate regulatory midway through a nasty downturn. Dividends should be cut, profit retained, growth curtailed – all of which is how banks get back to normal regulatory capital – but confiscation or nationalisation of banks because the regulatory buffers have been used up is harsh – and arguably unreasonable (unless replenishment is impossible, and the Federal Reserve has now stipulated that the acceptable timescale for replenishment is 6 months maximum or government funding and possible nationalisation will be forced).

4.2 Solvency against definition 2
Do the banks have positive net worth under GAAP? This is a much less strict test than the regulatory capital test. It’s a test of whether there is capital there – not whether there are buffers there. You would not expect there to be broad buffers at this point in the cycle (after all the point of a buffer is that it gets used in a market crash and economic downturn etc.) but soundness requires some buffer capital. Ultimately, the buffer for systemically important banks may include central bank drawing facilities and lender-of-last resort actions that can be either discrete or made public?

Hempton's view – open to debate – is that a reasonable regulatory buffer is that a bank – properly provisioned when disaster happens – should be forced to have at least one third of the Basel II minimum required regulatory capital – and should be restricted from reducing that capital (dividends, buybacks etc) until all buffers (Tier 1, Tier 2 and Economic Capital) are fully restored. Forbearance is right at this (low) point of the cycle (credit cycle and economic cycle) – but, unlimited forbearance is not right. And the Test of Definition 2 here is too weak for most policy concerns as a policy-application.

Nonetheless, on Test 2, the banks almost certainly collectively pass. The losses (yield to maturity basis) are unlikely to be more than $2tn (McDowell's calculated view also). We started with $1.4tn of capital – will have made probably $400bn on pre-tax-pre-provision profits and raised more than $500 bn.

Moreover, the whole point of securitisation and the “shadow banking system” was that it moved considerable losses outside of the banking system. As losses were moved elsewhere – whether that be to dumb hedge funds (of which HF-Implode has a large list) or to foreign trade-surplus countries, and to Europe e.g. Norwegian local government.

Hempton has a metaphor for how to think of Testing for definition 2. In the centre of the road are double lines. You are not allowed to cross them. Crossing them is dangerous (you might crash and you might cause injury to others). When you cross them you must get back to your own side of the road quickly. However, there are times of driving-stress when you cross them and that is considered normal and acceptable. A child runs out on the road – and under stress you swerve over the double lines. Nobody will confiscate your car and lock you up for that. However if you stayed over the double lines you would expect the government, the regulators, to come down on you hard, maybe take away your license or get a new driver for the truck? Breaching regulatory capital buffers is normal in times of stress – but staying at very low to zero levels of negative capital – that is suicidal, extreme business risk.

If we consider a modified Test 2 – whether banks have a third of required regulatory capital right now (say $500 bn) then it is harder to determine collective stress-test pass or failure – but Hempton's guess is pass. The losses in the system are indeterminate – but on a yield to maturity system $1.5 to 2tn seems about right (subject to expected PD, LGD, EAD, ELGD and Haircut values for severe downturns). Now there may be $500bn losses outside the banks (that is the shadow banking system). We started with $1.4tn and have raised a bit along the way. If losses are $2tn total – $500bn outside the system and there are operating profits along the way you get a bare pass.

The situation of trading books under Test 2 however is much more dire. They, under GAAP are mark to market – and as noted above the market values of assets are far below yield to maturity values. (The Roubini number of $3.4tn in mark-to-market losses comes to mind.) If these institutions are forced to account honestly, 'World according to GAAP' – to mark their own-book appropriately – they are very insolvent indeed, except that mark to market losses (in excess of yield to maturity losses) are offset to some extent by phony mark-to-market gain from reducing the value of own- liabilities from reduced credit- worthiness. Banks in this situation (insolvent under mark to market) include Citigroup, JP Morgan, possibly Bank of America having swallowed Merrill-Lynch, and possibly Goldman Sachs.

4.3 Solvency ny test 3: positive economic value of the banking entity.

This test requires adequate ability to repay debts of the banking system and have some income-based value provided the banking system is able to continue to function in cash-flow terms.

A proviso is critical. At the moment the banking system (indeed anyone) has a hard time getting medium-term affordable funding. This test presumes banks can fund themselves more-or-less-normally (because times are normal or governments have guaranteed the funding making the funding problems recede).

Here I, McDowell, and Hempton may be counted as radical. The system in our view clearly has positive economic value even when reserves are evaporating. (see Hempton in voodoo maths post http://brontecapital.blogspot.com and McDowell and Morrison in www.union-legend.com).

The issues here are unequivocal. The pre-tax, pre-provision income of the US banking system normally funded is probably $300bn. It is probably much larger if the funding costs were reduced to near to Treasury levels. Interest rate spreads and hence pre-tax, pre-provision profits of the banking system should (presuming normalised funding) be on the way way up. $300bn is an underestimate. So if there are $2tn of losses and $1.4tn starting capital then in 4-5 years banks return to be fully capitalised. We would get back there faster – as banks raise capital on the way down and not all the $2tn of end losses are born within the core banking system. Against "Test 3", therefore, the system is brimming with solvency.

Individual banks will be insolvent against this test – but the system is not and anyone that tells you otherwise is not doing the maths.

The usefulness of this test, however, is problematic. It presumes the system can continue to operate (a test falsifiable by facts on the ground). It then becomes an indicator of what happens if the system is near to or wholly nationalised, actually or effectively – and the government will make a profit, the same profits, or even more, that private suppliers of bank funding were maling pre-credit crunch.

It is therefoire the test of what happens if the system has credible government guarantees is sensibly run. (If you are going to give it government guarantees then – in our view – government might as well nationalise it (the 'it' is banks' ownership, their funding gaps, or both). At the very minimum governmental and regulatory controls are needed in strategic and tactical detail because otherwise government guarantees trigger egregious 'moral hazard' problems.

4.4 Test 4: do the banks have positive liquidation value?

This is easy – not. There is nothing wrong with the Roubini number of $3.4tn total (current accounting) losses if all assets on bank balance sheets are marked-to-market. Indeed if anything Roubini’s number is too low (a point McDowell made in the FT). Bluntly, if you liquidated the banks now the systemic and network losses (plus economic dislocation losses) are 'mobile telephone number' huge – too big for almost all major banks including those that meet regulatory tests in "Test 1".

The losses would be huge for the same reason that the banks are having trouble – nobody could leverage up to buy the assets at anything that looks like a reasonable “yield to maturity” value.

Incidentally, it should be noticed that a bank with adequate regulatory capital and well run and profitable in run-off will still have negative liquidation value. It is extreme to use liquidation value as the test - except in the event of widespread confiscation, liquidation value is the test that will be used (and we see the ripple impacts of Lehman brothers).

4.5 Test 5: do the banks have enough liquidity?

Well, also hard, but critically depends on government policy measures. Solvent banks (even "Test 1 Solvent Banks") will be "liquidity insolvent" if there is a general bank-run. Those who provide funding lose in a run and then any prospect of bank-runs becomes self- fulfilling. So far, several banks have failed "Test 5" – notably various prime-brokers and Citigroup (which is also a prime-broker). The ability to pass or fail "Test 5", however, comes mostly from the faith (market and customer and counter-party confidence) that major banks (especially if government-supported) will pass "Test 5".

If a bank passes "Test 3" above (and the US banking system as a whole does so) and people have sufficient faith then major banks should continuously pass Test 5, unless and until they encounter major operational risk events (that may range from Legislators' strike in refusing to pass government plans to banks exposed to exhorbitantly large market risk bets with own-capital that go wrong).

Government policy has been, arguably, arbitrary and capricious to date. The Hank Paulson plan was 'no plan' insofar as lacking consistency. It was ad-hoc. The “Geithner plan” is currently vague as to be meaningless. The vagueness risks failing to engage the Legislators on which it depends.

WaMu which was adequately capitalised had a minor run (induced by leaked rumours of government takeover) and was confiscated. Citigroup – being a broker – is almost certainly insolvent from a GAAP perspective – and had a major liquidity squeeze was given lots of cheap government funds, yet subsequently lost 90% share value (confidence was not shored up). In the WaMu case the intermediary funders had any rights confiscated. That was reckless and irresponsible.

If the government fails to get a consistent plan, top down and bottom up – and the plan's consistency does not appease intermediary creditors of banks (as argued in Hempton's “reckless and irresponsible” post) then the default option has to be nationalise the entire US banking system now – because almost all banks are dependent on intermediate funding – and that funding has political and economic fear-of-government control.

5. An observation

If you believe these numbers – as we do – then there is no need to nationalise the core banking system provided that confidence is given a floor and recovers in the system. that is a big proviso – we have some methods for getting confidence back into the system – but they are harsh ('hard love'?). Mostly it can’t be done with the current tier of banks' executive management (who are utterly discredited). Confidence requires to fully reflect, for example, Gordon Brown's terms "cleaning out the banks". It also can’t be done unless government policy becomes consistent and appears to be so, nationally and internationally. A strong plan with a clear overview capable of public scrutiny that translates into all critical details is necessary.

Nationalisation will work as a way of bringing confidence back (whether the Swedish model or not). Hempton first mentioned nationalisation (as something that would work) in June 2008. Wall Street journalists thought Hempton was being absurd then. He said he thought nationalisation might happen if government policy is badly executed. So far government policy has been - and the takeover of WaMu (which kicked the intermediate debt holders and hence put the fear-of-government into people that fund banks) is exhibit A, followed over a year later by allowing Lehman brothers to collapse (though the Bernanke of the Fed has since said he and the Treasury had no legal option to do otherwise, even if since much regretted). Hempton thought the end consequence of Sheila Bair’s action (FDIC) would be the nationalisation of the whole US banking system though he hoped for better. He hoped Hank Paulson – and later the Obama administration yoo would be better but so far remains very disappointed.

He says there would not be a crisis if people trusted (big banks and government) – even if the banks are 'marginally insolvent'. But, it is clear, banks have told lies – blatantly (notwithstanding if the blame may be transferred to inadequate accounting systems) – for so long that nobody believes them now (or not until new management is in place).

Hempton says that certainly the blogosphere has decided that banks are insolvent no matter what the banks themselves say otherwise – though the evidence for insolvency (other than mark-to-market insolvency as per Nouriel Roubini) is thin to non-existent. Mark- to-market insolvency is the norm.

6. Nationalisation, insolvency and process

Now bloggers or analysts tell you a bank or the system is insolvent, ask them what definition of insolvency they are using and test them against that definition!

Then test them against other definitions – and work out – in the context given – whether the institution is solvent against definitions appropriate to the present economic circumstances. Any who do not think clearly as to precise and context-given definitions of insolvency are being sloppily irresponsible – and that includes most bloggers we otherwise admire, including even Paul Krugman.

The context in which the banking system is insolvent requires:
(a) it is illiquid because people don’t trust it and
(b) it can’t get enough liquidity because it has to sell assets into a market in which they are trading considerably below their “yield to maturity or GAAP price” and
(c) if you sell it at that price you reveal “mark-to-market” insolvency as per Roubini.
(d) but, provided the banking system can remain liquid it will not actually be insolvent even if individual banks might be. [This is a US conclusion. The UK banks started much more thinly capitalised and Hempton thinks they are, or until recently were, insolvent.]

This is what the stakes are in the (so far) less than competent government policy as to how the banking crisis is to be managed. What is a marginal solvency crisis (all it is on a yield to maturity basis) is capable of being turned into the mother-of-all-liquidity -and-solvency crises. The banks brought in on by telling so many lies in the good times that they are disbelieved now. But now the problem is beyond the ability of the banks severally and collectively to control.

Wholesale nationalisation is not the right policy per-se, but is the inevitable result of following the wrong policies. The right policies involve selective nationalisation – what Hempton calls “nationalisation after due process”.

7. The “Geithner Plan”: module 1 – stress testing

The first element of the “Geithner Plan” is a stress-testing of banks. This is so vague as to defy description (a comon problem also in Europe due to the reliance on a few indicators only without models or equations for how to relate banks' performance to the markets, to the economy, and to government policies). That hasn’t stopped Governments from thinking that this should start quickly and be quickly completed (see www.Union-Legend.com and Yves at 'Naked Capitalism').

Fannie Mae (according to its 2006 10K) spent almost a billion dollars in 2006 alone trying to remedy its accounting system after its 2004 accounting scandal. And, that was just Fannie Mae. To do a proper stress-testing with qualified people across the banking system then the new accounting system and modeling bills will be in excess of $3bn dollars (and internationally, according to Charteris, $8bn). This is also a “stimulus” – lots of work for underemployed economic risk accountants.

At Fannie Mae as elsewhere such as much of the many $billion spent in Europe on Basel II the money so far spent wasn’t well spent, mainly because it was spent on the wrong priorities, Pillar I not Pillar II.

Anyway the words “stress testing” in Geithner’s speech do not constitute a plan. Not close. There is one stress test that it doesn’t cost a billion in accounting as a global first pass – and that is to say e.g. only 8% reserves against that pool of RWA loans – why don’t you price that in the market by CDS spreads - as Lloyds Banking Group are now doing. If you can sell those loans – even a few of them – at 92 cents in the dollar then your reserves are sensible. Having done that we can believe your assumptions and stress test using the bank’s existing assumptions and existing, however flawed internal risk accounting with maybe no worse than 20% error.

The only problem – a big problem – is that the secondary market price of the loans is way below the yield to maturity price – and if that is the test that you are going to have then you will reveal 'Roubiniesque' insolvency – because the whole system is grotesquely insolvent on a mark-to-market basis. A market based stress test can’t be done unless you fix the secondary market - and that may mean money market via the central banks and all other OTC credit markets via clearing houses and as soon as possible via regulated stock exchanges.

8. The “Geithner Plan”: module 2 – private money (Hedge funds etc.) involvement in purchasing illiquid assets from banks ($1 trillion worth)

Again the word “plan” is a misnomer here. More a statement of possibility. Geithner get the US Treasury to lend Private Capital a $trillion under favourable terms. Hempton figures that with such a loan that he could start making good money.

If instead of one fund with $150bn of private money and say $1,050bn of public money there are many funds of a fraction that size then we have a functioning secondary market for what banks are taking off their balance sheets. Essentially this is SIV tranches again but merely now repriced at a lower face value commiserate with where mark-to- market values have sunk, but allowing some new conditionalities over time on valuation by net income flows.

And this leads to what I think is the obvious meld of “module 1 and module 2”. That is
(a) establish the funds – but with a rule that investors are expected to, and only allowed to, bid on the assets sold by banks on their stress test, and
(b) having established the market for the secondary assets (admittedly supported by cheap money) you can get the banks to redo their reserves by selling sample assets into that market.

This allows a market restructuring of balance sheets – and hence to avoid the problems that caused Fannie Mae to waste a billion dollars re-structuring its accounts.

If banks have inadequate capital after testing in that market then we have the basis for forcing them to raise more capital or putting them into receivership – a functioning due- diligence process.

When banks are illiquid, rather than offer guarantees, beef up the secondary market by establishing more funds (with private money at risk in them). Then banks sell off their asset pools into the funds to gain liquidity.

This is a workable plan along Geithner lines. It won’t necessarily result in wholesale nationalisation – and I hope that it convinces you that national- isation is the end result of failure of policy rather than the next policy option or a policy goal in itself.

At worst it gets maybe a few hundred $billion of private money back into the fray. But, this time with all the due diligence requirements of a due process. A good-bank, not bad-bank, plan.

*It was Warren Buffett who first described financial accounts as a "self-assessed exam" for which "the penalty for failure is death". Hempton thinks he was talking about insurance companies – but the idea is the same; the unalloyed truth is not expected.

**Estimating end-losses for loans is always problematic. The modal outcome is near to zero (most loans pay) but the unexpected risk-tails are fat-tails. We live in "the time of fat-tail risks" – and getting a handle on this number requires "pretending we know as much about the future as we know about the past in order to know the present". And, plain fact is, we know the present fairly poorly because – as I have pointed out – bankers almost always lie, and current situation data always arrives late.

***Note - it was acceptable to pay bonuses to traders based on mark-to-market profits. Now they want those rules suspended. All cynical comments are reasonable.